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ADMINISTRATIVE PIROCEDURE-FTC FINDING OF TEND-
ENCY To DECEIVE SUPPORTED BY No EVIDENCE EXTRIISIC TO TRADE
LABEL ITSELF HELD PRECLUDED BY CONTRARY DECIsION nq PRIoR
ANALOGOUS CASE
Petitioner imported sweaters on which he affixed labels displaying
in large letters the trade name "Cashmora" and beneath it in much smaller
letters the constituent fibers: "30% Angora-707 Lambs Wool," an ac-
curate description of the contents. After a hearing at which the FTC
presented no direct evidence of consumer deception, actual or potential,
other than this label itself, the Commission found that the label was mis-
leading and deceptive in its suggestion that the sweater contained cashmere,
and that its use, therefore, was in violation of section 5(a) (1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.' It ordered the importer to discontinue
use of the word "Cashmora" other than on products containing a substantial
'amount of cashmere,2 and the importer petitioned for review. The court of
appeals vacated the order and remanded to the Commission, holding that
since the actual contents of the product were specified on the label, a cura-
tive qualification that the Commission had approved in Jacob Siegel Co.3 for
a similar trade name, "Alpacuna," the FTC was precluded from finding the
label deceptive per se. Furthermore, a finding that the label was deceptive
"as a whole" must be based on substantial evidence, which the court failed
to find in the Commission's record.- Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266
F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959).
The Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the FTC to prevent
persons, by cease and desist order, from engaging in an "unfair method of
competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce." 5 It is
sufficient to constitute a violation of this section if a trade name is displayed
which has the capacity and tendency to deceive the ultimate buyer.6 When
the Commission's orders are challenged in the courts, the act provides that
"findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall
166 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1958).
2 Elliot Knitwear, Inc., 1958 TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder, F.T.C. Com-
plaints, Orders & Stipulations 1957-1958) 127,199 (FTC 1958) [hereinafter cited as
1958 TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder 1957-1958)].
3 43 F.T.C. 256 (1946).
4 Furthermore, the court commented in extensive and considered dictum that on
the basis of the present record the Commission had abused its discretion in choosing
as a remedy complete excision of the trade name.
552 Stat. 112 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45(b) (1958).
6 FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922) ; Masland Duraleather Co.
v. FTC, 34 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1929); Fox Film Corp. v. FTC, 296 Fed. 353 (2d Cir.
1924).
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be conclusive"; 7 close restriction on the scope of judicial reexamination of
Commission fact determinations is implemental of congressional intent to
create an agency which through experience and careful study of the business
and economic conditions of the industries affected, might supply advantages
of expertise for the administration of trade practices and methods of com-
petition.8 A reviewing court, then, determines only whether the findings
of the FTC are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.9
Substantial evidence has been defined as that "affording a substantial basis
of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion
of the existence of the fact to be established." 10 But it is not enough for
petitioners contesting Commission orders to persuade the reviewing court
that there was evidence upon which the facts as claimed by them might
have been found, or that inferences favorable to them might have been
drawn by the Commission.1 Thus, where petitioners had disputed the
tendency of their representations to deceive, and issue had been drawn as to
the potentially misleading effect of those representations upon buyers and
consumers, some cases have sustained Commission findings of deception
under the substantial evidence test upon a record containing only the repre-
sentations themselves, without extrinsic evidence of their actual or probable
impact upon the perceptions and motivations of the public.12 These cases,
however, involved false advertising rather than trade names: the words
used were ordinary English phrases, not compounds or neologisms. In
other cases Commission findings of the misleading nature of trade repre-
sentations have been sustained where supported, in addition to the rep-
resentation itself, by public opinion surveys,13 customers' 14 and trades-
7 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958).
8 FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934).
9 Gold Tone Studies, Inc. v. FTC, 183 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1950); Jacob Siegel
Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1944), rev'd, 327 U.S. 608 (1946) ; El Moro Cigar
Co. v. FTC, 107 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1939). Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951). See also Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (5) (1958), which has the same requirement.
10 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1939).
11 FTC v. Standard Educ. Sot'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) ; Callaghan & Co. v. FTC,
163 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1947). A test often applied is that evidence is deemed sub-
stantial unless there is so little that had the case been tried before a jury the court
would have directed a verdict. For a discussion of this rule and of substantial evidence
in general see Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record;"
64 HARv. L. REv. 1233 (1951) ; Stason, "Substantial Evidence" In Administrative Law,
89 U. PA. L. REv. 1026 (1941).
12 E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
969 (1957) (slogans such as "churned to delicate, sweet creamy goodness," "the same
day-to-day freshness which characterizes our other dairy products" held deceptive
where product was oleomargarine). See also New Am. Library, Inc. v. FTC, 213
F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1954); Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944).
13 Arrow Metal Prods. v. FTC, 249 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1957) (survey of public
to determine if "porecenamel" was capable of deceiving).
14 Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952) (sales made to
thousands of women; testimony of fourteen that they had actually been misled held
sufficient) ; Gold Tone Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 183 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1950) (evidence
1959]
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men's 15 testimony of actual or probable deception. In one case, however,
a Commission finding of deceptive practice was held unsupported by the
evidence: a stipulation entered by the FTC declaring that of thirty members
of the public who could be called, twenty-four would testify to a misleading
understanding of the brands and labels involved, was there countered by
the unanimous testimony of witnesses who actually appeared, both for the
manufacturer and for the Commission.16  In the FTC proceedings in the
instant case, in addition to the label itself, there was evidence of a heavy
consumer preference for sweaters made of cashmere and of an effort by
petitioner to cut into that market1 7 with a sweater which in fact looked
and felt like cashmere but sold at a substantially lower price.' 8 There was
also evidence as to the immediate success of Cashmora sweaters during
a time of decline in distribution of other sweater lines of the petitioner. 19
However, there was no direct testimony as to the probable impression con-
veyed to the public by the Cashmora label or as to its capacity to deceive;
the extent to which the FTC, in light of the requirement that its findings
be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, may find
a coined-name label deceptive or misleading without such direct extrinsic
evidence is thus squarely put in issue.
Where the sole evidence adduced is a label bearing a name which is an
unambiguous English word like "Cashmere" 20 (and the product contains
little or no cashmere) a finding of deception would probably be upheld,21
presumably on the ground that the court itself, without need for further
explicative or corroborative data, could assess the minimal probative ca-
pacity of that evidence. When, however, the alleged deception is a con-
trived or compounded trade name and there is no evidence of record attest-
ing its potentially or actually deceptive qualities, the considerations become
more complex. Support for the FTC's conclusion of deceptiveness may
not of actual incidents of past reliance, but that some customers and amateur photogra-
phers would probably rely on trade name as descriptive of a process not in fact used) ;
Bear Mill Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 98 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1938); Marietta Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
50 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1931).
15 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1944), rev'd, 327 U.S. 608
(1946); Jacob Siegel Co., 43 F.T.C. 256, 272 (1946) (appendix).
16Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. FTC, 113 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1940).
'7 Elliot Knitwear, Inc., 1958 TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder 1957-1958)
27,199, at 36,601 (FTC 1958).
18 Brief for Appellee, p. 13, instant case.
19 Elliot Knitwear, Inc., 1958 TRADE: REG. RE'. (Transfer Binder 1957-1958)
27,199, at 36,601-02 (FTC 1958).
20 E.g, Wool Novelty Co., 1958 TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder 1957-1958)
27,261 (FTC 1958) ("100% Cashmere"; content substantially less than 100%
cashmere) ; Nederlandsche Weverij, N.V., 1958 TRADE REG. REP. (Transfer Binder
1957-1958) 127,253 (FTC 1958) ; Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 698 (1955)
("100% Cashmere"; contained a blend); Broadmore Fashions, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 610
(1955) ("100% Cashmere"; not a stitch of cashmere).
21 Cf. cases cited note 12 supra. This would be so even though, in the case of
a wool product, the seller listed the constituent fibers on the label as required by law.
Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 1129 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 68a, 68b
(1958).
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often here be premised on the accumulated specialized knowledge of the
agency. It seems clear that the wide discretion accorded the FTC extends
to the ability to make a finding based at least in part on past experience,
and it appears settled that the FTC is not required to sample public opinion
to determine what meaning is conveyed to the consumer but may draw its
own conclusion as to deceptive tendencies.22 Moreover, it is precisely in
such a circumstance, where the lay perspective of the judiciary is admittedly
incompetent to appraise the significance of the facts established, that agency
expertise becomes most important; ability to draw upon not only compila-
tions of previously established empirical data but upon the special acuity
that derives from continuing synthesis of that data is a prime advantage of
the administrative institution. It is infeasible that in each new case the
FTC put in the record-in the judicial sense-all of the facts upon which
its judgment as to the deceptive tendencies of the various characteristics of
a given label or representation may rest. Yet to the extent that no direct
extrinsic evidence of deception is in the record, a reviewing court may be
unable to weigh and determine, as it must under the statute, whether the
Commission finding is based upon substantial evidence. And, before the
Commission itself, the burden thrown upon the manufacturer or dealer to
rebut the often unarticulated inferences which the FTC may draw in part
from matters not of record is onerous. If application by extension to the
case before it of certain inference-guiding concepts inducted in a course of
prior experience is essential to agency functioning, it is equally essential that
the opposing private party have an opportunity to demonstrate that exten-
sion of those concepts to the facts of his case is inappropriate. This he
cannot do without knowing what those concepts are. Especially when the
issue is not a peripheral or subsidiary one-like a question as to what is
usual carrier practice as going to the reasonableness of a single cost item
in a rate case, or a more general statistical fact pattern used "legislatively" 2
3
as rationale to support a policy decision of the agency-but goes to the
primary, essential finding of the existence vel non of the very activity which
will make the party before it amenable to agency enforcement action, a
commission should be required to reveal to that party at least the dimension
of inquiry to which his proofs must be addressed. 24
Thus seen, the problem of "evidence" is the two-fold problem (1) of
alerting the alleged violator as to those matters of fact which will be opera-
tive in determining the FTC's conclusions as to the probable effects of his
activities, and (2) of demonstrating for the understanding of a reviewing
court the accumulated factual knowledge and fact-based presuppositions
22 E. F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 741 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 969 (1957) ; New Am. Library, Inc. v. FTC, 213 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1954) ;
Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1944) ; FTC v. Hires Turner
Glass Co., 81 F.2d 362, 364 (3d Cir. 1935).
23 See Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARv. L. Rxv. 537 (1949) ; Davis, An Approach
to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAv. L. Rav. 364 (1942).
24 Cf. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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which give meaning and probative weight to the specific evidence actually
adduced by the Commission in a particular case and control the inferences
which the Commission will draw upon that evidence. But, if this is so,
the protections sought to be secured by the evidence requirement can be
accorded, without sacrifice of the unique value of the FTC as a continually
informed expert appraiser of fact, by requiring of the Commission the
making of a record somewhat analogous to the kind of record which
the Supreme Court appeared to demand of it in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC.25
There, considering an order of excision of a trade name, the Court remanded
to the Commission because the latter had failed to articulate the fact bases
and the processes of reasoning by which it had concluded that this most
drastic remedy, rather than some milder remedial gesture, was needed to
extirpate the deceptive practice there involved. Analogously, it would seem
reasonable to apply an articulation principle to findings of the FTC insofar
as based on matters of fact not put on record by evidence produced at
hearing; this would, in the first instance, permit the reviewing court to
appraise with some sophistication the meaning and the probative impact
of whatever evidence is put in. And while, admittedly, such an articulation
would come too late to aid the individual manufacturer or dealer in the
formulation of his case before the Commission, consistent application of this
standard to appeals from FTC orders would in effect force the Commission
to illuminate those conceptions, and the underlying factual core supporting
those conceptions, which it will be utilizing as a point of reference for the
analysis of fact situations in future cases. This recurrent expression and, to
some extent, schematization of the common accumulating fact presupposi-
tions of the Commission would suffice to forewarn future defending parties
as to the necessary nature and direction of their defense.
Focusing upon the articulation principle sharply clarifies the area of
concern underlying the court's decision in the instant case and may, more-
over, explain and justify that decision, although the court's own reasoning
remains somewhat obscure and unsatisfying. The court places heavy re-
liance on Jacob Siegel Co. 26 and seems to derive from that case a substantive
rule whose effect would be, by directing what needs to be found in the
present case to establish a violation, to fix the minimum permissible quantum
of evidence sufficient to sustain the Commission's order. In Siegel, after
the Supreme Court's remand 27 to the FTC to reconsider its original order
of excision,28 the Commission reversed its prior determination of appro-
priate remedy and ordered that "nothing herein shall prohibit use of the
word Alpacuna to refer to respondent's garments if in immediate con-
junction therewith, whenever used, there appear words clearly and con-
25327 U.S. 608 (1946).
2643 F.T.C. 256 (1946).
27jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
2836 F.T.C. 563 (1943).
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spicuously designating all the constituent materials of fibers therein con-
tained." 29 From this the instant court argues:
"If the specifying of the fiber content was sufficient to cure the decep-
tion in Jacob Siegel, it must follow that a similar specification of the
fiber content in the present case precludes the Commission from hold-
ing the label here used deceptive per se. Let us compare the two
words: Alpacuna and Cashmora. Each of the names suggests a truth:
Alpacuna contains alpaca, and Cashmora contains angora. Each also
suggests a falsity: Alpacuna does not contain vicuna, nor does Cash-
mora contain cashmere. But in view of the specification of the actual
contents of the product, a finding that the label as a whole is deceptive
must be based on substantial evidence. Such evidence may perhaps
be obtainable, but it does not appear in the present record. The order
must accordingly be vacated, and the case remanded to the Com-
mission." 30
The problems with this analysis are manifold. It appears to suggest, first,
that while Siegel bars the FTC from finding the Cashmora label deceptive
per se, the Commission might find it in some other way deceptive-perhaps
deceptive "as a whole"-and that for the latter kind of finding a different
variety of evidence-evidence extrinsic to the label itself perhaps-need
be adduced. But it is not the label that is deceptive per se or not per se:
there exists no substantive rule of per se deceptiveness or non-per se
deceptiveness. A given label will in any event have its impact upon the
buying public in terms of the total set of circumstances of its appearance
to them. Deceptiveness per se, if it means anything in this context of
requisite substantial evidence, means such deceptiveness as may be found
on the face of the label without the FTC adducing additional extrinsic
evidence to prove it. But this, of course, is the question before the court.
To seek the answer to that question in the controlling authority of Siegel,
moreover, involves two seemingly unfounded sets of assumptions. The
initial set involves the propositions (1) that the instant case is on all fours
with Siegel and (2) that it is for the court to say that it is on all fours with
Siegel. That the court's comparative analysis of names is unconvincing
as to the first of these propositions appears from a brief survey of the
differences between the two names whose similarities the court perceives.
In Cashmora, the false impression inheres in the first, perhaps more salient
portion of the word; in Alpacuna, in the last. Cashmora more closely
resembles cashmere alone than does Alpacuna vicuna alone: while in the
latter case the reader, alerted to the fact of a mixed product, may be led
to read the content specifications, in the former he may never be so alerted.
Vicuna was probably a less well known fiber in 1946 than is cashmere in
29 43 F.T.C. 256, 259-60 (1946).
30 Instant case at 789-90.
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1959, less apt to capture and exclusively fix the prospective buyer's atten-
tion. How relevant are these factors? How relevant may other factors
be: different relative sizes of the name and content specification printings
on the two labels? differences in advertising practices and competitive out-
look generally as between 1946 and 1959? differential degrees of public
awareness? Therein lies the significance of the second proposition tacitly
assumed by the court when it sought by comparing trade names alone to
bring the present case under the authority of Siegel. It is submitted that
this sort of comparison is one that the court is ill-suited to make, that the
court is not the tribunal best qualified to pass upon either the relevance or
the relative significance of the various assimilating and distinguishing fac-
tors, that such an appraisal is in fact precisely the task of the FTC.
The court's second set of assumptions seems equally problematical. A
determination that in the absence of evidence showing in the instant case a
deceptiveness-indeed, the language of the court appears to say, a kind of
deceptiveness-not present in Siegel, the Commission is precluded from
finding a violation, implies (1) that the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable
to the FTC and, moreover, (2) that the court on review sits to enforce that
doctrine on the agency. Yet not only is it generally agreed that "the doc-
trine of stare decisis is not generally applicable to the decisions of adminis-
trative tribunals," 31 but the FTC itself seems little inclined to strict ad-
herence to precedent. In fact, in Country Tweeds Inc.,3 2 decided in 1953,
the Commission held that "Kashmoor" was subject to clarification by
"contains no cashmere," whereas in 1938, in a case involving the same
exact trade name, the FTC had required complete excision of the name
because the garment contained no cashmere. 33 Even as voluntary agency
practice, stare decisis seems out of place in the administrative realm, where
flexibility to work out practical adjustments in complex fact situations is
at a premium. The tentative, trial-and-error nature of agency regulatory
activity, the highly volatile and dynamic condition of the subject areas of
its administration, the tendency to disposition of adjudication without
broadly reasoned articulation of doctrine or principle,34 all militate against
the importation of this traditional judicial attitude. But if a strict rule of
31 Kentucky Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 174 F.2d 38, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; see
FTC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 228 (1946). See generally COOPER, ADMNIsTaA-
TIvE AGENcIES AND THE CoURTs 238-41 (1951).
32 50 F.T.C. 470 (1953).
33 Cohen Bros., 27 F.T.C. 923 (1938). Note that the 1953 case postdated the
Supreme Court's disposition of Siegel. That decision, however, did not deny the
FTC power of excision, but affirmed, rather, that the balance of accommodating trade
name preservation with the prevention of deceptive practices was "a question initially
and primarily for the Commission." 327 U.S. at 612. In its emphasis upon the pro-
tection to be afforded trade names as valuable business assets, even when found to
have been used deceptively, the Court relied heavily on FTC v. Royal Milling Co.,
288 U.S. 212 (1933), which was recently on the books at the time of the 1938 "Kash-
moor" order.
34 The usual FTC decision is composed of a copy of the complaint, a statement
of numbered findings of fact, a statement of conclusions, and the order. DAvis,
ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW § 167, at 548 (1951).
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stare decisis is undesirable even as a self-imposed procedure of adminis-
trative dialectic, a strict stare decisis enforced upon the agencies by review-
ing courts is altogether unworkable. Indeed, stare decisis as an inflexible
requirement compelled from without the set of tribunals whose methods it
controls would be an historical aberration, as well as a practical calamity,
even for the judicial institution itself. Certainly it is impossible that the
instant court, whatever its language, could have meant to adopt the thesis
that an agency, if it sought to reverse itself on a fourteen-year-old decision,
could be denied the power to do so by a court invoking stare decisis
principles.
So untenable, then, are the assumptions that would have to be made
in order to derive from Siegel a rule that could affect the obligation of the
FTC to produce extrinsic evidence in the instant case, that what the court
of appeals is here doing must be explained by analysis in another area of
discourse. It is submitted that the rationale of articulation above suggested
best explains the case. What disturbs the court is not so much the failure
of the FTC to prove that the present case is not Siegel as the failure of the
FTC to express a comprehensible, intellectually satisfying concept capable
of reconciling the present case and Siegel-a problem not of evidence but of
explication. The element now held lacking and which is needed to support
the Commission's findings need not necessarily be constituted of testimony
or evidence extrinsic to the Cashmora label, but may equally be supplied
by illumination of the inferential bases of the reasoning process by which
the FTC, from that label alone, found the fact of deception established. It
is submitted that this is in fact the most plausible way to read the instant
case, and that it is now open to the Commission on remand to supply the
court's requirement of "substantial evidence" by inference drawn in view
of its expertise upon the adduced evidence already before it, so long as its
inferences and the connection of its inferences to its accumulated experience,
on the one hand, and to its conclusions, on the other, are clearly articulated.
ADMIRALTY-~rowEn OwEs DUTY OF IREASONABLE CARE
To ALL LAwFuLY ABOARD
While defendant's vessel was docked at a New York pier, plaintiff
came aboard to pay a social visit to a crew member who had obtained per-
mission from the executive officer to entertain plaintiff on board. Leaving
the ship, plaintiff fell on a stairway and was injured; subsequently he
brought this diversity action for damages, alleging a defective condition of
the stairway and predicating claims on grounds of unseaworthiness and
negligence. Ruling that New York law controlled, the district judge
withdrew the unseaworthiness count, charged the jury that under the
common law plaintiff was a "gratuitous licensee" who could recover only
1959]
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if defendant had failed to warn him of a dangerous condition of the premises
actually known to defendant, and, after a jury verdict for plaintiff, set the
verdict aside and dismissed the complaint for failure of proof of such actual
knowledge. The court of appeals affirmed,1 but on certiorari the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed and reinstated the jury verdict,2 holding that
admiralty law governed the case and that, in admiralty, "the owner of a
ship . . . owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his
legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care. . . ., 3
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
Prior to this decision the shipowner in maritime law,4 like the land-
owner at common law,5 was held to no duty of ordinary care to protect
from unsafe conditons of the premises that category of persons entering
with his permission but not in furtherance of his interests whom the law
dubbed "licensees." The owner's only obligation to such persons was to
refrain from injuring them willfully or wantonly or by setting traps for
them, or by exposing them without warning to actually known preexisting
dangers; it had been said, also, that he would be liable for harming his
licensees by active negligence once their presence was known.7 These rules
had had their origin in the feudal 8 and early property law notion that each
I Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 245 F2d 175 (2d Cir. 1957).2 The jury verdict on the negligence count was reinstated on the theory that if
"the shipowner owed [plaintiff] . . . the duty of exercising ordinary care, then
upon this record [plaintiff] . . . was entitled to judgment, the jury having resolved
the factual issues in his favor under instructions less favorable to him than should
have been given." Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,
629-30 (1959). The district court's withholding of the unseaworthiness issue from
the jury was approved by the Court, not, however, on the lower court's reasoning
that the rights of the parties were governed by state common law, but inasmuch as
plaintiff was not one of that class of seamen and maritime workmen to whom ad-
miralty extends the absolute protection of shipowner's responsibility for seaworthiness.
Id. at 629.
3 Id. at 632.
4 Kosba v. Bank Line, 46 F.2d 119 (D. Md. 1931) ; The Sudbury, 14 F.2d 533
(D. Ore. 1926); Anderson v. Scully, 31 Fed. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1887). Cf. Lauchert v.
American S.S. Co., 65 F. Supp. 703 (W.D.N.Y. 1946) (Mich. law) (semble). See
note 24 infra.
5 Koppelman v. Ambassador Hotel Co., 35 Cal. App. 2d 537, 96 P.2d 196 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Jones v. Schmidt, 349 Ill. App. 336, 110 N.E.2d 688 (1953);
Indianapolis Motor Speedway Co. v. Shoup, 88 Ind. App. 572, 165 N.E. 246 (1929) ;
Nocar v. Greenberg, 210 Md. 506, 124 A.2d 757 (1955); Platnick v. Feldman, 285
App. Div. 1086, 140 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1955).
6 Maritime: Aho v. Jacobsen, 249 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. granted and
rev'd per curiam on authority of instant case, 359 U.S. 25 (1959); Rodermond v.
United States, 179 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1950); Gunnarson v. Robert Jacob, Inc., 94
F.2d 170 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 660 (1938) ; Kosba v. Bank Line, 46 F.2d
119 (D. Md. 1931); The Sudbury, 14 F.2d 533 (D. Ore. 1926).
Common Law: Apanovich v. Wright, 226 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1955) (Me. law)
(dictum); Johnson v. Macias, 193 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1952) (Tex. law) (dictum);
Comstock v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 632 (D. Md. 1953) (Md. law).
7 Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Newton, 131 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1942) (N.C.
law) (dictum); Voirin v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 151 Misc. 498, 270
N.Y. Supp. 643 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (alternative holding). Compare 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 35h (1950), with 38 Am. JuR. Negligence § 104 (1941). Lauchert v. American S.S.
Co., 65 F. Supp. 703, 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1946), also states that this is the rule.
s Instant case at 630; ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMrS 114 (1941); 2 HARER
& JAMES, TORTS § 27.1, at 1432 (1956).
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man ought to be able to do with his own as he wished: 9 by the no-duty rule,
as a matter of law, the courts could protect the landowner from juries who,
it was feared, would always find for the injured entrant on the land.10
Exception to this general rule was later made in favor of those who paid
or otherwise economically benefited the owner in using or coming on the
premises; these entrants, it was said, denominated "invitees," had given
consideration and could in return expect reasonable precautions to make
the property safe for their use.:" But for those whose presence brought no
profit to the owner, the common law,1 2 and the maritime case law by adop-
tion,13 saw no reason why they should expect care in the preparation of the
premises, their use of which was a privilege and a gift.' 4 Increasingly this
distinction has been criticized for inequality: though they trip into the same
hole, the business entrant can recover while the social guest cannot.15 In
more basic criticism, the commentators have pointed out that our societal
attitudes toward property have long since changed from the feudal notion of
absolute, irresponsible ownership to the idea that owning comports not only
the privileges and benefits of use, but also the responsibility of control for the
physical safety of the community '---a theory more consonant with our
complex, mechanized, urban society.17  They have believed that the law
should change to accommodate these new attitudes.' 8
9 ELDREDGE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 114; 2 HARPER & JAMES, Op. Cit. supra note 8,
§27.1, at 1432; SALMOND, TORTS 477 (12th ed. 1957); Bohlen, Duty of Landowner
Toward Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 237
(1921); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and
Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 184 (1953).
10 Cf. Toomey v. London, B. & S.C. Ry., 3 C.B. (N.S.) 146, 149-50, 140 Eng.
Rep. 694, 696 (C.P. 1857); Marsh, supra note 9, at 185. See generally FLEMING,
TORTS 148-49 (1957).
1l Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274, 283-87 (1866) (Wiles, J.) ; Voirin v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 151 Misc. 498, 270 N.Y. Supp. 643 (Sup. Ct.
1933) (dictum); ELDREDGE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 118; FLEMING, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 428, 440-44; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 332, comment a (1934).
12 FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 10, at 454.
13 See cases cited note 23 infra.
14 ELDREDGE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 115-16; PROSSER, TORTS 445 (2d ed. 1955);
SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 477.
15 Law Reform Committee, Third Report, CMD. No. 9305, at 28-29 (1954).
16 PROSSER, op. cit. mupra note 14, at 427; Marsh, supra note 9, at 184. This idea
had found expression previously in other tort areas in which the landowner's duty
was enlarged. For example, he had been held absolutely liable for non-natural,
ultrahazardous activities when they "escaped!' from his land and injured his neighbors,
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) and had been held liable to those attracted
onto his land by an instrument negligently left there, PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 438-45, and to third persons for injuries caused by the defective condition of the
premises turned over to his tenant for a public use, ELDREDGE, Op. cit. supra note 8,
at 129-50. Most writers favor a duty of reasonable care rather than absolute liability,
for they fear that the greater liability "would involve too severe and indiscriminate
a restriction on individual freedom of action and run counter to the decidedly indi-
vidualistic notions of the common law." FLEMING, op. Cit. supra note 10, chs. 8, 19.
See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 428.
17 Instant case at 630.
18 See FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 10, at 429, 454; 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit.
supra note 8, §§ 27.1, 27.8, at 1468-70; Momus, TORTS 145-47 (1953); SALMOND, op.
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Contemporaneous with this growing criticism, the basically simple
no-duty rule was being pulled apart and its scope restricted in both mari-
time ' 9 and terrene tort cases 20 by a process of reclassification of entrants
into new categories which imposed on owners varyingly defined duties
of care. By the time of the instant case there had come into being a body
of law replete with subtle and often confusing refinements, rooted upon
the original licensee-invitee distinction.2 ' But the Supreme Court had
never decided what duty of care to the traditional "licensee" the admiralty
law imposed upon the shipowner: 22 the Court might here have followed
lower court decisions accepting the fine gradations of the common law 23
or looked, as had those lower courts, to the common law itself,2 4 and
cit. supra note 9, at 478-79; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed
to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144, 181 (1953); Law Reform Committee, supra note
15, at 33.
19 Compare Radoslovich v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S.A., 72 F.2d 367 (2d
Cir. 1934), with Aho v. Jacobsen, 249 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1957). Also compare
McCann v. Anchor Line, 79 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1935), with Zaia v. "Italia!' Societa
Anonyma Di Navagazione, 324 Mass. 547, 87 N.E.2d 183 (1949).
20 See, e.g., Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945) (Iowa
law).
21 Instant case at 630-31 & n.6; SALmoND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 507-08.
22 Instant case at 630.
23 Rodermond v. United States, 179 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Gunnarson v. Robert
Jacob, Inc., 94 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 660 (1938) ; Silverado S.S.
Co. v. Prendergast, 31 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1929) ; Swanson v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,
17 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1927); Lauchert v. American S.S. Co., 65 F. Supp. 703 (W.D.
N.Y. 1946) (Mich. law) ; Apostolou v. Eugenia Chandris, 1938 Am. Mar. Cas. 995 (D.
Ore.); Kosba v. Bank Line, 46 F.2d 119 (D. Md. 1931) ; The Sudbury, 14 F.2d 533
(D. Ore. 1926) ; Anderson v. Scully, 31 Fed. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1887) ; The Germania, 10
Fed. Cas. 255 (No. 5360) (S.D.N.Y. 1878) ; Zaia v. "Italia" Societa Anonyma Di Navi-
gazione, 324 Mass. 547, 87 N.E.2d 183 (1949); Freeman v. United Fruit Co., 223
Mass. 300, 111 N.E. 789 (1916) ; Metcalfe v. Cunard S.S. Co., 147 Mass. 66, 16 N.E.
701 (1888).
24 In several of the earlier admiralty cases involving claims for personal injuries
sustained in state territorial waters allegedly through the negligence of defendant
shipowners, it is left unclear whether the courts conceive of themselves as applying
directly the common law of the jurisdiction or as adopting local common-law prin-
ciples as part of a controlling maritime law. Rodermond v. United States, 179 F.2d
955 (3d Cir. 1950); The Sudbury, 14 F.2d 533 (D. Ore. 1926). Even where the
action was brought at law in a state forum and the traditional common-law doctrines
were utilized, the exact relation of the common law to the cause-whether it governed
of its own force or was incorporated, in the absence of an established admiralty rule,
into the body of applicable maritime law-has been left obscure. Zaia v. "Italia"
Societa Anonyma Di Navigazione, 324 Mass. 547, 87 N.E.2d 183 (1949). But where
plaintiff in a legal diversity action in the federal district court based his claim to
recover for a maritime wrong upon a state wrongful death statute, one court clearly
regarded itself as bound by the common law of that state. Lauchert v. American
S.S. Co., 65 F. Supp. 703 (W.D.N.Y. 1946). While recent decisions of the Supreme
Court support this latter doctrine, The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959)
(in admiralty suit based upon state wrongful death act and predicated upon alleged
unseaworthiness, governing law is that of the act) ; United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki,
358 U.S. 613 (1959) (same result in diversity action at law), another contemporary
doctrinal development by the Court seems now to have clearly established that in
non-death cases claims for maritime wrongs sounding in negligence are controlled by
federal admiralty law, at least in the federal courts. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406 (1953). Compare the reservation of that question in Caldarola v. Eckert,
332 U.S. 155 (1947). Dictum in the instant case, which follows Pope & Talbot in
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denied recovery. Instead, it drew upon the commentators, 25 English
remedial legislation,26 previous maritime cases extending relief to persons
who might, under the classificatory schemes, have been deemed "invitees," 27
a perceived amorphous judicial evolution toward owners' responsibility,28
and considerations of "justice," "simplicity" and "practicality," 29 assert-
ing its function to declare "the general maritime law, free from inappro-
priate common-law concepts" 30 in laying on shipowners the single standard
of ordinary care.
In such a decision, resting upon such sources, there may be witnessed
an unique role of the Court usually obscured by its other more frequent,
more evident roles. Sitting in admiralty, with its traditional freedom, the
Court may sometimes employ its substantial prestige to shape the develop-
ment of the private law. As admiralty precedent, this decision can only
control, of course, in cases involving maritime torts,3 ' but its significance
as authority for a new departure within the common law should not be
ignored. It is true that admiralty doctrine is often substantively different
from the common law in those areas where similar wrongs are to be re-
dressed, but these divergences can be justified in terms of differing pertinent
underlying conditions. In admiralty law, the shipowner owes to his crew
maintenance and cure when injured,32 is absolutely liable for injuries caused
by unseaworthiness of his ship,33 and does not have the defenses of voluntary
assumption of risk 3 4 and contributory negligence 3 5 to bar his liability.
The rationale for these rules is that seamen cannot ascertain the dangers
of an unseaworthy vessel before signing on,30 are generally unable to leave
holding that federal law controls, goes so far as to assert that, since the injury occurred
upon navigable waters, "if this action had been brought in a state court, reference to
admiralty law would have been necessary to determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties." Instant case at 628. To determine what law governs, as a matter of
legislative jurisdiction, is of course not to determine what rule of law should control.
25 Instant case at 631 n.8.
2
61d. at 632 n.10; Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
27 Instant case at 630.
281d. at 630-31.
29 Ibid.
3
0 Id. at 630; The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 577 (1874) ; U.S. CoNsT.
art. III, § 2.
31 See note 24 mpra.
32 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932); The Iroquois,
194 U.S. 240 (1904) ; GmmoRE & BLACK, ADmmALTI 253-71 (1957).
33 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158, 175 (1903). Cf. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracld, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). See G.m.oRE
& BLACK, op. cit. mpra note 32, at 315-32; Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and
the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381 (1954).
34 Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 432 (1939); The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1936).
35 The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
36 The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1937) ; State of Maryland, 85
F.2d 944, 945 (4th Cir. 1936).
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the premises to escape these dangers,37 must accept without critical examina-
tion and without protest the orders of officers in order to maintain essen-
tial discipline,38 and, while at sea, are helpless to provide for their own cure
when injured.8 9 The special rules have also been justified as encouraging
seamen to remain in their hazardous occupations in the interest of national
defense.4° These same peculiar factors which within admiralty jurisdiction
itself legitimate different treatment of seamen and non-seamen also make
the admiralty's onerous duty-to-seamen doctrines inapposite in the common
law.41 But it is obvious that none of these special considerations will serve
to distinguish the shipboard from the landside "licensee." Not only is the
total fact-relationship to his environment of the licensed entrant on a vessel
very dissimilar to that of the seaman himself-for which reason the liberal
admiralty duty rules in favor of the crew have never been made available to
the visitor 4 -but that relationship appears in no significant dimension
different from that of the licensed entrant onto land. It might be argued
that the danger to the maritime visitor is greater, shipboard surroundings
being both more highly mechanized and less familiar; 43 but, while this dis-
37 Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430 (1939); The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1936); The Edith Godden, 23 Fed. 43, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1885) ; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 105 (1946) (Stone, J., dissenting).
38 Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, supra note 37, at 430; The Arizona v. Anelich,
supra note 37, at 122-23; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932) ;
Storgard v. France & Canada S.S. Corp., 263 Fed. 545, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1920) ; The
Edith Godden, supra note 37, at 46. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 37,
at 105 (Stone, J., dissenting); Mahnick v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944).
89 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932).
40 Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (Story, Circuit Justice,
1823), cited and approved in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 728 n.2
(1943); Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938); Farrell v. United
States, 336 U.S. 511, 523-24 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41 However, the recent extension of seaworthiness liability to protect longshore-
men and others was not justified on the basis of the considerations enumerated in
text, nor can it be. Instead the Court based the extension on the fact that these
workers are doing traditional seamen's work, that the work is extremely hazardous
in the vessel's normally tight quarters, and that the shipowner is the better risk
bearer. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 93-94, 96 (1946). Though these
policy reasons would not seem in fact to justify distinguishing longshoremen from
ordinary land workers, they appear, nevertheless, more tenable than any distinction
which can be drawn between non-worker entrants on shipboard and shore.
42Instant case at 629. United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959)
(unseaworthiness) ; Weiss v. Central R. Co., 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956) (mainte-
nance and cure) (court, holding plaintiff a seaman, assumes that such holding is
prerequisite to finding duty on defendant) ; GILMORE & BLACK, op. Cit. supra note 32,
at 255, 358.
4 3 The amount of care demanded will of course vary with the degree of danger
as known to the owner. Thus to impose the same duty of care upon the landowner
as upon the shipowner is not to impose upon them the same burden of care. What-
ever distinction in degree of danger may separate the two cases, then, will be reflected
in differential burdens and should not be urged to support a rule of different duty.
It should be noted that the same distinction in degree of danger will not, on the other
hand, as going to the reasonable apprehension of the entrant and thus to the amount
of care which he must use to protect himself, offset entirely the heavier burden of care
placed upon the shipowner than upon the home owner under this theory, since the
entrant's own negligence while wholly barring recovery under the common-law con-
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tinction may perhaps be valid as applying to the social guest in the private
home, it does not seem to hold as against the licensee-entrant on many kinds
of commercial property currently within the scope of the common-law
no-duty rule. And similarly, as regards a second possible argument for
restriction of the rule of the instant case to admiralty-that while it is one
thing to demand a measure of care of the owner of a vessel which must
in any event be made safe for the members of its crew and which, by its
very nature, seems a place where the presence of many persons, of whatever
legal character, may be expected, it is quite another to impose on the home-
owner a duty to make his house safe for the social guest-this reasoning,
if it has any validity at all, seems rather relevant to a distinction between
the home owner and small private vessel owner on the one hand, and the
owner of larger, more frequented, commercial terrene and maritime prop-
erty on the other, than to a thesis of non-applicability of the rule developed
for maritime torts to cases on land. In the instant case the Court distin-
guishes the common and admiralty laws only in terms of their ancient
histories 44 and predicts for the future of the common law a growth toward
the single-standard duty rule.45 In view of the close affinity of position of
the non-work-connected entrant onto land or onto vessel, it seems not un-
likely that the Kermarec decision itself will stand as a persuasive authority
whose influence upon that growth may be substantial.
46
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE Co1VI0TIO1x OF HomowNER
FoR REFU3SAL To PERMIT ENTRY BY MUICIoPAL ALTH I SPEcTOR
WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANT HEiU NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PRooEss
Acting on a complaint from a neighboring resident who had discov-
ered rats in her basement, and after a preliminary investigation had re-
vealed outside appellant's home-which appeared in an "'extreme state of
decay'"-a pile of "'rodent feces mixed with straw and trash and debris
to approximately half a ton,'" a Baltimore city health inspector requested
permission to enter the house to make a basement examination for the
purpose of detecting rodent infestation.' On grounds that the inspector
tributory negligence doctrine, goes only to proportional reduction of damages in
admiralty. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); The Max Morris, 137
U.S. 1 (1890). Instant case at 629-32. See generally SALMOND, op. cit. mupra note 9,
at 478.
44 Instant case at 631-32.
45Id. at 631.
46 Ironically, however, a recent New York case has approvingly cited the Ker-
marec language describing the evolution of the common law-including the passage
characterizing the conditions of its evolution as a "semantic morass"-in an opinion
which apparently reaffirms the many intricate distinctions of that state's common law.
The reasoning of the court is bewildering in this regard. Molnar v. Slattery Con-
tracting Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 95, 185 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1959).
1 It is provided by BALTimoRE, MD., CODE art 12, § 112 (1950), that "every dwell-
ing and every part thereof shall be kept clean and free from any accumulation of
dirt, filth, rubbish, garbage or similar matter, and shall be kept free from vermin
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had no warrant, appellant denied him access and was subsequently con-
victed 2 and fined for refusing to permit the inspection in violation of the
municipal health inspection ordinance.3 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court, affirming five-to-four, held that in view of the imperative
need of the states to protect public health, and because "only the slightest
restrictions" 4 were placed upon his constitutional right of privacy by the
city code, penal punishment for resisting entry of the inspector had not
deprived appellant of due process of law. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959).5
Although several times advocated in dissent by two of its present
Justices, 6 the thesis that the fourteenth amendment applies to the states,
verbatim, all of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights has been con-
sistently rejected by the Court.7 Despite repudiation of the incorporation
theory, however, several among the restrictions of government activity
embodied in the first eight amendments have been held so fundamental
or rodent infestation." Art. 12, § 120 of the Code provides that "whenever the Com-
missioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house,
cellar, or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and if the owner
or occupier shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he
shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars."
2 Conviction was had in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, on trial de novo from
a magistrate's court, and a decision rendered without opinion. Certiorari was denied
by the Maryland Court of Appeals, presumably because the issue had been previously
considered and resolved in Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
a See note 1 supra.
4 "[I]t [the inspection] is hedged about with safeguards designed to make the
least possible demand on the individual occupant, and to cause only the slightest
restriction on his claims of privacy." Instant case at 367.
5 Mr. Justice Whittaker wrote a brief concurring opinion, and Mr. Justice
Douglas, with whom the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Brennan
concurred, dissented.
6 Dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947), Mr. Justice Black,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joined, stated: "My study of the historical events
that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the expressions of those who
sponsored and favored, as well as those who opposed its submission and passage,
persuades me that one of the chief objects that the provisions of the Amendment's
first section . . . were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights ap-
plicable to the states. . . ." He does concede, though, that "this historical purpose
has never received full consideration or exposition in any opinion of this Court inter-
preting the Amendment. . . ." Id. at 72. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 174 (1952) (concurring opinion); id. at 179 (concurring opinion); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39 (1949) (concurring opinion) ; id. at 40 (dissenting opinion).
7 "We have said that in appellant's view the Fourteenth Amendment is to be
taken as embodying the prohibitions of the Fifth. His thesis is even broader. What-
ever would be a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments I to VIII) if
done by the federal government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth
Amendment if done by a state. There is no such general rule." Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). "The notion that the 'due process of law' guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments of the
Constitution and thereby incorporates them has been rejected by this Court again
and again . . . ." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949). "Specifically, the due
process clause does not protect, by virtue of its mere existence, the accused's freedom
from giving testimony by compulsion in state trials that is secured to him against
federal interference by the Fifth Amendment . . . ." Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 54 (1947). "The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment . .. .
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942). Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
99 (1908).
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to the "concept of ordered liberty" 8 as to be inherent also in the notion of
due process; 9 and-perhaps to give more definite form to the nebulous
contours of fourteenth amendment protection, 10 perhaps by appeal to
objectively enumerated, officially enshrined standards to avoid the danger
of real or apparent subjectivity "--there has persisted a tendency in the
Court to conceptualize due process problems in categories of concern iden-
tified with the more precise articulations of the prohibitions on the federal
government.12 Indeed, as regards actions by state officials deprivative of
those liberties which are secured against the United States by the first
amendment, the Court has often talked as though the fourteenth operated
to make that particular Bill of Rights provision immediately binding on
the states.13 Whether the same degree of de facto incorporation has ob-
tained as to the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures 14 is questionable. In Wolf v. Colorado,15 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter for the Court recognized that "the security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the
8 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
9 "[T]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it unlawful
for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First Amend-
ment safeguards against encroachment by the Congress . . . or the like freedom of
the press . . . or the free exercise of religion . . . or the right of peaceable as-
sembly . . . or the right of one accused of crime to the benefit of counsel ...
In these and other situations immunities that are valid as against the federal govern-
ment by the force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found
to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, become valid as against the states." Id. at 324-25 (dictum) (double
jeopardy). "Freedom of speech and of the press are safeguarded by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. . . . The First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against
abridgement by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion else-
where. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,
-principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its
due process clause." Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (freedom of
speech). Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780-81 (1949) (right to counsel) ; Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) (freedom of religion) ; West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (dictum) (freedom of
religion and expression).
10 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-71, 173 (1952) (majority), and id. at
175 (concurring opinion).
11Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952) (concurring opinion);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (dissent). But see Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's defense against the charge of subjectivity, Rochin v. California, supra at 169-70.
12 See cases cited note 9 supra; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
13 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 29 (1946), and id. at 31-33 (dis-
sent) (parsing wording and reviewing history of the first amendment in a case
involving state activity), West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 634, 637 (1943).
14 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
15338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause." 16 And while the Court there held that
nothing in the fourteenth amendment made the federal exclusionary rule 17
mandatory upon states, it went on to say that "were a State affirmatively
to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." ' 8 The question of whether and
to what degree the due process stricture subjected state action to fourth
amendment limitations had been reserved earlier in Adams v. New York,' 9
and has not, in its broad dimensions, been again before the Court.20 A
recent district court decision has flatly asserted, however, that "an unrea-
sonable search by a state agent or official is not such a violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as will invoke operation of
that amendment." 21  An early commentator had made the same asser-
tion.22 In view of this uncertainty respecting the status of fourth amend-
ment searches under the fourteenth, the treatment of Frank by all of its
three opinions becomes particularly significant.
One way to approach the instant case would be immediately to ask
whether the activity of a city health inspector is a "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. This is indeed the whole thrust of the
dissent, which concludes, after long consideration of the history and "the
philosophy of the Fourth Amendment," 23 that "the inspector's knock on
16 Id. at 27-28.
17 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See generally Fraenkel, Recent
Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1928).
18 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
19 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904). Mr. Justice Day speaks of the contention before
the Court in terms of privileges and immunities rather than due process.
20 The rule of Wolf has kept from before the Court very nearly the whole of
that class of cases involving the admission of prosecution evidence in non-federal
criminal trials, in which the question of the constitutional validity of searches by state
police is most likely to arise. Thus the Court, faced only with such extreme instances
of official lawlessness as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), has never had
to draw the fine lines which might reveal a difference in treatment of state as against
federal cases. So long as a criminal defendant can show only a violation of the
fourth amendment, no matter how flagrant, Wolf precludes the federal courts from
further inquiry. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). Moreover, the
presence in virtually every state constitution of a Bill of Rights provision analogous
to the federal fourth amendment, Carroll, The Search and Seizure Provisions of the
Federal and State Constitutions, 10 VA. L. REv. 124 (1923); Fraenkel, Concerning
Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1921), has probably obviated the need
for federal concern in many search cases.
21 Mackey v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 579, 581 (W.D.S.C. 1957). "While the
Fourteenth Amendment places a limitation on the action of a state in regard to
United States citizens, it has not been construed to operate so as to make the prohibition
of the Fourth Amendment as regards unreasonable searches apply to the states or
to agents or officials of the state." Ibid.
22 Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity Against Searches and
Seizures, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 11 (1927). The author relies, inappropriately it seems,
on People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926). All that Judge Cardozo there held was that the fourteenth amendment would
not be violated by state abolition of the "immunity against search and seizure without
a warrant insofar as that immunity has relation to the use of evidence thereafter!'
Id. at 28. (Emphasis added.)
23 Instant case at 380 (dissent).
RECENT CASES
the door is one of those 'official acts and proceedings' . . . squarely
within the Fourth Amendment." 24 But once declared a "search," inspec-
tion must be "reasonable" in fourth, not fourteenth, amendment terms; the
rules deriving from the federal criminal evidence cases become apposite.2 5
These cases give effect to the conjunctive no-unreasonable-searches and
no-warrants-but-upon-probable-cause clauses of the amendment by treating
searches as presumptively unreasonable if not under warrant issued on
probable cause; the burden of demonstrating circumstances which make
reasonable a warrantless search lies heavily on the searcher.2 6 The per-
tinent circumstances are those of the particular fact situation of each
case; 27 the individual search must find its justification in some urgency
or exigency or special situation.28  Thus three exceptions to the general
rule that a search must be under warrant have been made in the criminal
administration area: where tangible objects which may subsequently be
admitted as evidence in a prosecution are in imminent danger of destruc-
tion,29 in the apprehension of moving vehicles,30 and as incident to a valid
24 Instant case at 383 (dissent). This view was also taken by Judge Prettyman
in District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other than
constitutional grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), stating that the "distinction between
'inspection' and 'search' of a home has no basis in semantics, in constitutional history,
or in reason. 'Inspect' means to look at, and 'search' means to look for."
25 'We have emphasized over and again that a search without a warrant can be
made only in exceptional circumstances. If a house is on fire or if the police see a
fugitive enter a building, entry without a search warrant can of course be made. Yet
absent such extraordinary situations, the right of privacy must yield only when a
judicial officer issues a warrant for a search on a showing of probable cause." Instant
case at 380 (dissent).
26 "Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the Amend-
ment requires adherence to judicial processes . . . . Only where incident to a
valid arrest, . . . or in 'exceptional circumstances,' . . . may an exemption lie,
and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it."
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). 'We cannot be true to that con-
stitutional requirement [of privacy] and excuse the absence of a search warrant with-
out a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that
the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). Concurring, Mr. Justice Jackson asserted: 'When
an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to
justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed
action to get a warrant." Id. at 460.
2 7 Quoting from Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956),
the court in Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1957), observed:
"In general terms, the test to be applied [under the fourth amendment, on a search
and seizure question generally] is whether the thing done, or attempted to be done,
in the sum of its form, scope, nature, incidents and effect, impresses as being funda-
mentally unfair or unreasonable in the specific situation, when the immediate end
sought is considered against the private right affected." And see United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) : "What is a reasonable search is not to be deter-
mined by any fixed formula . . . . The recurring questions of the reasonableness of
searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case."
28 There is no question but that general exploratory searches are banned. United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947)
(dictum).
29 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (dictum).
30 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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arrest.31 But in the instant case, the dissent points out, "no excuse exists
. . . for not getting a search warrant." 32 Having decided, for purposes
of application of the fourth amendment to the activity as a category, that
health inspections are as much "searches" as are police investigations of
crime, this line of analysis ignores whatever differences there may be be-
tween the two classes of official action insofar as the constitutional safe-
guard demands a warrant for both.
33
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion, on the other hand, pur-
posefully and painstakingly declines decision of any fourth amendment
questions, cautiously couching both his formulation of the issue 3 4 and his
conclusion in pure due process terms, 5 avoiding attachment of the "search"
label to his description of the facts of the case, never once invoking the
word "reasonable." Yet the opinion does not explicitly disclaim all con-
sideration of fourth amendment problems: rather it, too, treats at length
the historical antecedents of the federal search and seizure provisions,3 6
broadly distinguishes health inspections as a class from criminal law en-
forcement as a class, 3 7 and concludes "that there is 'a total unlikeness'
between 'official acts and proceedings,' Boyd v. United States . . . [a
fourth amendment case] . . . for which the legal protection of privacy
requires a search warrant under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the situa-
tion now under consideration." 38 Yet however its result be rationalized
-whether by the construct that health inspection is entirely without the
ambit of the fourth amendment,3 9 or of so much of the fourth amendment
as the fourteenth's right of privacy embraces, 40 or that, while it is a
31United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
32 Instant case at 381 (dissent).
33 Mr. Justice Douglas does point out, however, that "the test of 'probable cause'
required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search
that is being sought." Instant case at 383 (dissent). See note 74 infra and accom-
panying text.
34 "Application of the broad restraints of due process compels inquiry into the
nature of the demand being made upon individual freedom in a particular context
and the justification of social need on which the demand rests." Instant case at 363.
35 "[W]e cannot say that the carefully circumscribed demand which Maryland
here makes on appellant's freedom has deprived him of due process of law." Instant
case at 373.
361d. at 363-65.
37 Id. at 367.
38 Id. at 372-73.
39 This formulation, not necessary to the decision of the case now before the
Court, becomes determinative in the case of federal non-criminal inspection legislation.
Such legislation, Washington, D.C., Commissioners' Regulations Concerning the Use
and Occupancy of Buildings and Grounds § 10, April 22, 1897, as amended, July 28,
1922, was in fact challenged in a case on all fours with Frank in District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other than constitutional grounds,
339 U.S. 1 (1950). There the court of appeals held the provisions penalizing resistance
of inspection void as violative of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court avoided
the constitutional issue by holding Mrs. Little's conduct to be outside the purview
of the enactment
40 See notes 8-22 mipra. A theory that health inspections without a warrant,
while valid under the fourteenth amendment, are invalid under the fourth, would
square the holding of the court of appeals in District of Columbia v. Little, rupra
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"search," an inspection is a search prima facie reasonable although without
a warrant 41 it is clear that the Court has treated inspection as a phe-
nomenon apart, not subject to the case-by-case scrutiny of circumstances
which has been the method of judicial examination of warrantless criminal
law enforcement searches.42  Even this conclusion, however, demands
qualification: Mr. Justice Whittaker, although joining in the opinion of
the five-Justice majority, wrote as well a separate short concurrence ascrib-
ing to the majority the tenet that "the core of the Fourth Amendment
prohibiting unreasonable searches applies to the States through the Due
Process Clause," 43 and, after a precise depiction of the fact circumstances
of the case-stressing that disease-carrying rodents were "known to be
somewhere in the immediate area" 44-- concluding that the state action
here involved "did not amount to enforcement of, an unreasonable search
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." 45
But despite the conceptual subtleties involved in framing the doctrinal
issue presented, it is not difficult to isolate the fundamental question which
splits the Court in Frank: whether for purposes of federal constitutional
protection against the warrantless entry of state officials into a private
dwelling, distinction is to be drawn between police investigation for the
enforcement of criminal law and health department inspection for the dis-
note 39, with Frank and with the two state court decisions in accord with Frank.
Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956) ; State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168
Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), cert. granted, 360 U.S. 246 (1959). Language in
the opinions of these decisions, however, would be difficult to reconcile.
4 1 Compare the Court's treatment of reasonableness in the criminal search cases
note 26 supra.
42 See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text. "While the question has never
been directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed that one's house can-
not lawfully be searched without a warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest
therein. . . . The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself un-
reasonable and abhorrent to our laws." Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32
(1925). Where the smell of opium led officers to believe that an offense was being
committed and they entered and searched, the Court has said, "there are exceptional
circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against
the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may
be dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered for not obtaining
a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay
necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. These are
never very convincing reasons .... " Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15
(1948).
43 Instant case at 373 (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.) Compare Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's formulation for the Court: 'We have said that 'the security
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police' is fundamental to a free
society and as such protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 362-63.
44 Id. at 373.
4 5 Id. at 373-74. The thrust of this ultimate negative pregnant is more than a
little obscure. It is rather surprising that in the face of the very intricate and puzzling
range of attitudes displayed even within the majority of the Court, one commentator
has written of Frank: "Repeating its famous dictum in Wolf v. Colorado that the
due process clause protects a right of 'privacy,' the Court then made it plainer than
it did in the Wolf case that this right is the freedom from 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' guaranteed by the fourth amendment. On this base it found the Baltimore
ordinance to impose a 'reasonable' search. . . ." 34 WASH. L. REv. 437 (1959).
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covery of unsanitary housing conditions.46  While the dissent is inclined
to assimilate "the policeman's or the inspector's knock on the door," 4 7 the
opinion of the Court insists on differentiating "inspection without a war-
rant, as an adjunct to a regulatory scheme for the general welfare of the
community and not as a means of enforcing the criminal law." 48 Thus
it is less fruitful to attempt analysis of the holding in terms of the pre-
Convention history of fourth amendment concepts 49 or the federal law
of search and seizure8 0 than to consider the institution of inspection, its
similarities to, and its differings from, police administration. 51 Inspec-
tion 52 is widely provided for by municipal codes,53 of which the Baltimore
enactment here at issue is typical:
"Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect
that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand
entry therein in the day time, and if the owner or occupier shall refuse
46 How the distinction will be treated doctrinally is less important than whether
or not the distinction is made. Once it is determined that the city health inspector is
involved in a different category of state activity than the policeman, the differentiation
may be applied doctrinally at any one of a number of levels of analysis. It may be
held that inspection is not a fourth amendment "search," while police investigation
is; or that the former is an invasion of the right of privacy under the fourteenth,
while the latter is not; or that the former is prima fade reasonable without warrant
while the latter is presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a showing of peculiar
justifying circumstances.
47 Instant case at 383 (dissent).
48 Id. at 367.
49 The respective historical essays of the majority and the dissent well demon-
strate the polyvalence of historical fact. Some excellent research has been done in
the area, however. See LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Johns Hopkins University
Studies in Historical and Political Science, LV no. 2, 1937); Andrews, Historical
Survey of the Law of Searches and Seizures, 34 LAW NOTES 42 (1930) ; Fraenkel,
supra note 20; Wood, mpra note 22.
50 The literature is extensive. Excellent comprehensive treatments will be found
in Trimble, Search and Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment as Interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court (pts. 1-4), 41 Ky. L.J. 196, 388 (1952-1953), 42 Ky.
L.J. 197, 423 (1953-1954); Fraenkel, Search and Seizure Developments in Federal
Law since 1948, 41 IOWA L. REV. 67 (1955); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the
Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 IOwA L. REV. 472 (1948) ; Fraenkel, supra
note 17; Fraenkel, mpra note 20. For an excellent compilation of the more recent
Supreme Court cases, see the appendix to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion
in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 175 (1947).
51But see 34 WASH. L. REv. 437 (1959). Clearly, such consideration as we
suggest is not within the competence of the arm-chair theorist. Rather, it is a matter
for field studies of police investigations and health inspections. The presuppositions
advanced in text are no more than presuppositions; they do not intend to present
empirical fact.
52 Inspection as here used signifies the kind of examination of the private dwelling
by an authorized public health official which is involved in Frank. It is not meant
to include cases involving inspections of food producing, transporting or marketing
facilities. Manifestly, the inspector in Frank presents a different case than the
inspector involved with a truck of suspectedly unwholesome produce or with a shop
where possibly tainted meat is being sold.
53 See generally RHYNE, MUNICI'.L LAW §§ 26-28, 26-31 (1957); Guandolo,
Housing Codes in Urban Renewal, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1956); Stahl
& Kuhn, Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. PIT. L. REV. 256 (1950).
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or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall
forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars." 54
Similar examination provisions frequently authorize entry by officials
charged with investigative functions under electrical and building codes.55
They implement schemes of local regulation whose basic principle is the
imposition on the property owner of responsibility for the maintenance of
safe or sanitary premises: the Baltimore Health Code, more specifically,
levies the duty of keeping dwellings "clean and free from any accumulation
of dirt, filth, rubbish, garbage or similar matter and . . . free from
vermin or rodent infestation." " When notified by the Commissioner of
Health that his premises do not conform to code standards, the owner
must abate the offending conditions; continued non-conformity after notice
subjects him to prosecution for misdemeanor penalized by fine. r7 Where
conditions are so noxious as actually to menace health, the Commissioner
may himself abate them.5 8  Pursuant to these provisions, Baltimore health
officials have averaged over 30,000 inspections a year during the last five
years.5 9 Prosecutions for refusal to permit entry are estimated at one
per year.
6 0
Perhaps the most salient differentiating factor, then, between these
inspections and police investigatory activity aimed at enforcement of the
criminal law is that in the latter instance state officials are in quest of
particular articles connected with the commission of suspected particular
crimes, which articles are subsequently to be used in evidence upon prose-
cution for those crimes. Inspection, on the other hand, "is merely to
determine whether conditions exist which the Baltimore Health Code
proscribes. . . . No evidence for criminal prosecution is sought to be
seized." 61 Indeed the majority opinion seems to seize upon this element
of distinction and to make it determinative.6 2 Yet decision on these grounds
may raise more problems than it answers. Suppose that the health in-
spector, having once entered without a warrant pursuant to the code and
under the authority of the instant case, discovers substandard conditions.
The commissioner orders the nuisance abated. Now the inspector seeks
reentry, again without a warrant, to ascertain whether the order has been
complied with. This time, should he again find the premises in a non-
54 BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950).
55 RHYNE, MUNIcipAL LAw § 26-31 (1957).
56 BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 12, § 112 (1950).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Instant case at 372 n.16.
60 Ibid.
61 Id. at 366.
62 "[I]t was on the issue of the right to be secure from searches for evidence to
be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental
liberty was fought." Id. at 365. See also id. at 363-64.
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conforming state, the homeowner is liable to immediate prosecution,
63
and the inspector's report will certainly be the evidence advanced to sup-
port his conviction. The city ordinance makes no distinction between
these two entries. Will the Frank Court? Has the majority opinion by
its reasoning foreclosed finding the second inspection constitutionally valid?
The significance of this question is pointed up by the fact that Maryland
has by statute adopted the exclusionary rule in trials of misdemeanors; 64
if the inspector's second entry is illegal, no conviction for violation of the
code can be sustained on the basis of the evidence he finds. Certainly
the follow-up visit is as essential for administration of the public health
program as the first; in fact, barring the follow-up may make the first
ineffective. It can be argued, of course, that to demand a warrant for the
later entry will not obstruct the enforcement scheme, since the inspector
will have no difficulty in establishing probable cause on the basis of the
first inspection. Query, however: probable cause for what? Probable
cause to believe that an unsanitary condition exists? Or that that con-
dition has been maintained after and in violation of the Commissioner's
order, which continued maintenance alone subjects the homeowner to
penalty? Does the officer enter now as inspector or as criminal enforce-
ment agent? Will the answer to this rather obscure question determine
the quantum of proof requisite to demonstrate probable cause?
Indeed it is upon the problem of probable cause and its prior deter-
mination by a judicial official, the essence of the search warrant pro-
cedure, that consideration of the normative validity of the Frank decision
can most meaningfully turn. Other factors, matters of distinction between
the health inspection and the police investigation, exist and may be im-
portant. Thus, while both kinds of intrusion involve a certain amount
of inconvenience and affront to dignity of the homeowner, the inspection
may be both less disturbing and less offensive: the inspector's examination,
seeking conditions which are likely to be apparent to his trained, if not to
the inexperienced, 65 eye, will tend to be less time-consuming 66 and to
63 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
64 "No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be deemed admissible where
the same shall have been procured by, through, or in consequence of any illegal search
or seizure . . . ." MD. AN. CODE art. 35, § 5(a) (1957). Maryland could, of
course, abrogate this statutory rule without violation of the federal constitution.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Commentary on the exclusionary rule is
abundant. An excellent recent treatment is Barrett, Exch'sion of Evidence Obtained
by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565 (1955).
A good select bibliography is found in id. at 579 n.62.
65 In the instant case, where a half-ton of rodent feces and other refuse had
accumulated in the rear of the house, see text above note 1 mtpra, it is difficult to
imagine that conditions in the basement would have necessitated a particularly long or
minute inspection. Other kinds of conditions less evident to the untrained eye, may
be equally dangerous to health. Stahl & Kuhn, supra note 53, at 275. But even these
should reveal themselves to the professional inspector without necessity for the kind
of searches often involved in police cases.
66 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 149 (1947): "One agent was
assigned to each room of the apartment and, over petitioner's protest, a careful and
thorough search proceeded for approximately five hours. As the search neared its
end, one of the agents discovered in a bedroom bureau drawer a sealed envelope
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involve less intimate handling of the owner's personal effects.67 Similarly,
the stigma attaching to health inspection is quite probably not as severe
as that attaching to a police visit; even when not routinized, the inspector's
call will tend to inspire less damaging public reflection on the owner's
reputation. Again, the incidence of coercion or brutality after entry
seems infinitely more likely in the case of the police; 68 even in the absence
of such overtly aggressive behavior, the very presence of an armed police-
man may be more offensive than that of a health inspector. And, while
criminal law administration does not and cannot depend upon one hun-
dred per cent enforcement, public health programs aimed at the control
of, for example, communicable diseases, do and must. 9
But these are to some extent matters of degree and, in any event, relate
to issues not decided in Frank: the Court does not purport to pass upon the
full range of safeguards that due process may extend to the homeowner as
against the inspector. Indeed, the majority clearly implies that cases
involving other circumstances-nighttime entry, forcible entry, entry under
conditions of inconvenience to the owner-may pose other problems.
70
Appellant here based both his refusal of permission to enter and his sub-
sequent judicial challenge of his conviction upon the sole ground that the
inspector had no warrant; the basic issue presented is whether a health
inspection official, who like all state officers is subject to whatever other
limitations due process may impose, is required also, as a precondition
of constitutional validity, to procure a search warrant issued upon prob-
able cause in every case where permission to enter is refused.
7 1
6 7 There should be no need to refer to the extreme horror cases such as Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (concealed microphone installed in bedroom), to
document prevalent police indelicacy. Police searches of the home, if they are to serve
their purpose must almost of necessity involve going through the owner's effects with
a fine-tooth comb.
68 See Barrett, supra note 64, at 584-86 and authorities cited therein at 585 n.79.
69 See Stahl & Kuhn, upra note 53. This is perhaps the most significant, though
unarticulated, aspect of the Court's emphasis in Frank on "the need to maintain basic,
minimal standards of housing, to prevent the spread of disease and of that pervasive
breakdown in the fiber of a people which is produced by slums and the absence of
the barest essentials of civilized living. . . ." Instant case at 371. The minority
opinion's answer that "health inspections . . . are hardly more important than the
search for narcotic peddlers, rapists, kidnappers, murderers, and other criminal ele-
ments," id. at 382, is sufficient if addressed merely to the issue of importance, but
ignores the distinctly different nature of the enforcement problems involved in the
two situations.
70 Instant case at 366-67.
71 The issue might be more precisely phrased as whether the inspector is required
to justify his inspection as "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth--or the
core-of-the-fourth-amendment. This formulation would be of greater technical ac-
curacy insofar as some warrantless searches have been found to be reasonable. See
notes 25-31 supra and accompanying text. But, practically, to subject the inspector
to the standards articulated in the criminal-search fourth-amendment cases is to
demand that he obtain a warrant. The inspector in Frank, for instance, could not,
as the dissent points out, note 32 supra and accompanying text, meet the tests imposed
by the cases which justify search without warrant. Here was no urgency: a full
1959]
276 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108
It is with regard to the question so framed that the significant differ-
ence between the inspection and the police search for detection of criminal
law violation becomes apparent. As regards the latter, official intrusion
upon individual privacy is justified only because of the commission of cer-
tain specific acts which infringe the proscriptions of penal law. While it
cannot of course be demanded of government that it know to a certainty
the existence of those acts before it authorizes its agents to impose upon
the individual the disturbance incident to their investigations, it is rea-
sonable to require that a certain degree of cause be shown to believe that
those acts have in fact occurred, and that an independent judicial official,
not subservient to the police administration, appraise in each case whether
the causes which support belief attain that degree of certainty. This kind
of inquiry as to the existence vel non of specific facts and the tendency
of those facts to sustain inference of other specific facts is the traditional
and particular realm of judicial function; and in the instance of alleged
ascertainable acts in violation of criminal law, that function has a fact base
to which to attach. But the principles of the inspection scheme, as part
of a regulatory pattern which imposes upon each individual in the com-
munity a continuing obligation affirmatively to maintain a condition of his
premises which conforms to a specified statutory standard, are quite dif-
ferent. Here no specific acts of the individual are required to make him
a legitimate object of administrative scrutiny; his amenability to examina-
tion derives not from the fact of his having taken some particular action
judicially ascertainable, but from an obligation laid upon him as upon the
whole body of the public. Whether the government has the right to lay
such an obligation is of course a judicial question. But it is a general
judicial question, a matter of balancing the public interests and the private
interest in the wide, average-case perspective. This is not to suggest that
due process may not offer restrictions upon government power to lay the
obligation either to keep private premises in a given condition or to submit
those premises to official scrutiny to assure maintenance of that condition.
Perhaps due process should demand-although the Court in Frank, sus-
taining the conviction, appears to hold that it does not demand-that such
an inspection scheme provide for prior notice to the inspectee, or for some
accommodation to his convenience. But these too are general questions.
What should be apparent is that, in a health inspection program, there is
no function that the kind of case-by-case judicial scrutiny implied in the
warrant procedure can serve. And there must be added to these con-
siderations the observation that in the field of health the kind of evidence
which would be necessary to establish probable cause for believing in the
day was permitted to elapse before the inspector revisited the premises and swore out
appellant's arrest warrant There was no danger of the house, with its suspected
rodent population, removing itself from the jurisdiction. Nor was there a public
danger in that the unsanitary conditions might be cleared up before the inspector
returned; indeed, that occurrence would have exactly satisfied the objectives of the
statute.
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existence of an unsanitary condition may itself be discoverable only upon
investigation. As one commentator has implied, "the germ theory of dis-
ease is sufficient answer" 72 to the proposition that health inspection pro-
cedures must wait until a showing of probable cause is made in each indi-
vidual case. A public health program optimally may require a system of
routinized inspection on no cause at all.
73
Even Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion appears to recognize
the necessity for health inspection on less than traditional probable cause
and, by implication, the inappropriateness of the interposition of any strict
judicial scrutiny in the inspection-authorizing process. His solution, how-
ever, is to suggest that what will constitute probable cause to the satis-
faction of a magistrate in a health inspection warrant case need not be so
much showing as would be required to justify a police search; indeed, "the
passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient
in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant." 74 It may be
suggested that this "synthetic search warrant," 75 as the majority of the
Court dubs it, is open to a number of objections. If the judicial official
is to become a mere rubber stamp---as in practical fact he probably will
under such a concept of probable cause-why bother with him at all? But
if, on the other hand, a serious determination is to be made of the propriety
of periodic inspections in regard to any particular health problem, it
would seem that that determination should rather be made by a legislative
or administrative body for the generality of cases than by a magistrate
for "a given situation." More seriously, there is a real danger that in
having magistrates issue two different sets of investigation permits under
two different standards of probable cause, some magistrates at least will
tend in course of time to amalgamate the standards: once probable cause
loses its stricter meaning in one context, some dilution of its force as a
meaningful safeguard in criminal law administration may well follow.76
A preferable solution, and one that should be dispositive of the instant case,
is that in the field of public health inspection no search warrants should
72 Stahl & Kuhn, supra note 53, at 275.
73 Stahl & Kuhn, supra note 53.
74 Instant case at 383 (dissent). "This is not to suggest that a health official
need show the same kind of proof to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must
who would search for the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. Where considerations
of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of 'probable
cause' to make an inspection are dearly different from those that would justify such
an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken. Experience may
show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities without a further showing
of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being
maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be
sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant." Ibid.
75 Id. at 373.
76 The majority's insistence that "if a search warrant be constitutionally required,
the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous con-
stitutional restrictions for its issue," ibid., appears to reflect this fear.
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be required, because that kind of prior judicial scrutiny which they are
intended to secure is neither effective nor appropriate.
77
77 The Frank case does not go so far as to sustain state authorization of the
routinized, periodic health inspection program. It does not have to. The Baltimore
Code provision authorizes entry only when the commissioner of health "shall have
cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house," note 54 .rupra, and on the facts
of Frank there was no want of "cause to suspect." See text above note 1 .rpra.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court enumerates as one of the "safeguards"
with which he finds the inspection provision "hedged about," instant case at 367, that
"valid grounds for suspicion of the existence of a nuisance must exist" Id. at 366.
And Mr. Justice Whittaker in his purposively delimiting fact statement of the case
notes that rats were "known to be somewhere in the immediate area." Id. at 373.
While granting that it is ordinarily wise judicial policy to decide constitutional cases
by the narrowest reasoning capable of reduction to a meaningful principle, one may
yet regard as unfortunate this particular limitation of Frank, inasmuch as it appears
not only to restrict, but rather affirmatively to distort, the most tenable argument
in support of health inspection constitutionality. If the analysis suggested herein
is valid, see notes 71-73 and accompanying text, a no-cause inspection statute should
be at least as easy to sustain as a cause-to-suspect statute. In any event, the Court
will not long be able to avoid passing on the validity of an enactment of the former
type. Certiorari has been granted in State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123,
151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), cert. granted, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), in which is challenged
DAYTON, OHIO, CODE §806-30 (1954) which provides: "The Housing Inspector is
hereby authorized and directed to make inspections to determine the condition of
dwellings, dwelling units, rooming houses, rooming units and premises . . . in order
that he may perform his duty of safeguarding the health and safety of the occupants
of dwellings and of the general public. For the purpose of maldng such inspections
and upon showing appropriate identification the Housing Inspector is hereby authorized
to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable hour all dwellings, dwelling units,
rooming houses, rooming units, and premises. The owner or occupant . . . or the
person in charge . . . shall give the Rooming Inspector free access to such dwelling,
dwelling unit, rooming house or rooming unit and its premises at any reasonable hour
for the purpose of such inspection, examination and survey." Violation is punishable
by fine of not more than $200 or imprisonment of not more than 30 days or both.
DAYTON, OHIO, CODE § 806-83 (1954). The Ohio Supreme Court sustained the ordi-
nance on the support of Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956) (sustaining
Baltimore ordinance in same form as that upheld in Frank), and disapproving District
of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other than constitutional
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), note 39 supra.
